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Defending conspiracy cases has never 
been an easy ta sk . There were days in 
which joint t rial s of 20, 30, 40, or 
even 50 defendants were not uncom-
mon , creating insuperable problems 
for defense lawyers. 1 Even though 
large joint-defendant trials are not as 
common today,2 severe problems re-
main, particularly in light of the fre-
quent use of the conspiracy charge at 
the federal level. 3 In this article I will 
discuss some of the recent issues 
which create special difficulties for 
criminal defense lawyers. With regard 
to these issues, there is, as some 
would say, good news and bad news. 
The Bad News 
Proof of the Agreement 
Proving an agreement, obviously 
central to the conspiracy count, is 
rarely a difficult task for the pros-
ecution. There need not be an express 
agreement and circumstantial evi-
dence can be used to prove the 
existence of the agreement . One 
troublesome development, making 
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ble' today for the 
defense lawyer in the 
world of conspiracy 
prosecutions? 
the agreement even easier to prove, is 
the so-called unilateral approach to 
conspiracy. This approach was first 
promoted by the drafters of the 
Model Penal Code and has been 
adopted by a number of state legis-
latures . The typical statute is much 
the same as Section 8-2 of the Illinois 
Criminal Code which provides: 
"Conspiracy . (a) Elements of the 
offense. 
"A person commits conspiracy 
when, with intent that an offense be 
committed, he agrees with another to 
the commission of that offense. No 
person may be convicted of con-
spiracy to commit an offense unless 
an act in furtherance of such agree-
ment is alleged and proved to have 
been committed by him or by a co-
conspirator. 
"(b) Co-conspirators. 
"It shall not be a defense to con-
spiracy that the person or persons 
with whom the accused is alleged to 
have conspired: 
"(I) Has not been prosecuted or 
convicted, or 
"(2) Has been convicted of a dif-
ferent offense, or 
"(3) Is not amenable to justice, or 
"(4) Has been acquitted, or 
"(5) Lacked the capacity to com-
mit an offense." 
The key difference between this 
type of statute and the traditional 
conspiracy statute is that under the 
standard view the prosecution must 
prove that two or more persons ac-
tually agreed. Under the unilateral 
approach the prosecution need only 
prove that this defendant agreed with 
another person . In many cases that 
will matter little . In some cases, 
however, the di fference will be 
significant. In a recent Indiana case,' 
the defendant was intent on murder-
ing her husband. She asked the aid of 
two persons, one of whom was a 
police detective, the other a police 
agent. At no time did the officer or 
the agent have any intent to commit 
the murder. The defendant was con-
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victed of conspiracy to commit 
murder because she had agreed to 
commit the crime, even though the 
other "conspirators" had not. 
This view of conspiracy law has 
been subject to considerable criti-
cisms as the major rationale for the 
conspiracy charge - the fear of group 
activity - is nonexistent in such cases. 
Nevertheless, a growing number of 
states has adopted the approach and 
The result in 
Rodriguez will create 
severe difficulties for 
defense counsel in drug 
conspIracy cases. 
many recent cases have followed it in 
upholding the convictions of defen-
dants who thought they were agreeing 
with other people who were in fact 
police agents.s 
Cumulative Punishment, Multiple 
Conspiracies 
In Braverman v. United States, 7 the 
United States Supreme Court held 
that a single agreement to commit 
more than one substantive crime 
"cannot be taken to be several 
agreements and hence several con-
spiracies because it envisages the 
violation of several statutes rather 
than one."8 
This ruling has been consistently 
followed in situations in which a 
single general conspiracy section is 
violated - 18 USC §37 I - or in which 
there have been violations of the 
general conspiracy statute along with 
a more narrow conspiracy statute.s 
When two specific conspiracy statutes 
have been violated, however, the 
courts are far from consistent. 
The most recent discussion of this 
issue was by the en banc Fifth Circuit 
in United States. v. Rodriguez. 10 The 
defendants were charged with viola-
ting two specific drug conspiracy 
statutes under Title 21 of the United 
States Code. 11 Only one agreement 
was alleged . The court emphasized 
Congress' intent to punish severely 
violations of the drug laws. Because 
"the Double Jeopardy Clause im-
poses no limits on Congress' power to 
define the allowable unit of prosecu-
tion and punishment, at least so long 
62 
as all charges are brought in a single 
proceeding" the defendants could be 
sentenced consecutively for violations 
of the respective conspiracy 
statutes. 12 
The result in Rodriguez will create 
severe difficulties for defense counsel 
in drug conspiracy cases. Braverman 
clearly held that a single agreement 
could not be split into several agree-
ments merely because it violated more 
than one statute. As stated by Judge 
Rubin in his dissenting opinion in 
Rodriguez: 
"I see little difference between 
fragmenting a conspiracy according 
to the number and diversity of its ob-
jectives in order to charge several vio-
lations of a single statute, and using 
the same technique to charge viola-
tions of two statutory provisions. The 
teaching of Braverman is that a con-
spiracy cannot be so fragmented. "13 
In spite of this criticism, however, 
several circuits have utilized the 
reasoning in Rodriguez l4 and the 
Fifth Circuit itself has applied the 
rule to drug conspiracies and con-
spiracies under the RICO statute 
(Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations, 18 USC § 1961 , et 
seq.) . IS 
Co-Conspirator Declarations 
Statements made by co-conspir-
ators during the course of and in fur-
therance of the conspiracy are ad-
missible at trial against the declarant 
and any other members of the con-
spiracy. While the very nature of this 
rule has been subject to some 
criticism, it is a well-entrenched 
feature of evidence law. Three aspects 
of it, however, are troublesome. 
First, what kind of evidence can be 
used to prove that the declarant and 
the defendant were both members of 
the ongoing conspiracy and to prove 
that the statements were made in 
furtherance of that conspiracy? Most 
courts take the position that the hear-
say declaration itself cannot be used 
to prove the membership in the con-
spiracy. There is, however, a rather 
ominous line of cases which suggests 
that under the new Federal Rules of 
Evidence hearsay evidence itself is ad-
missible to prove the conspiracy. 
For instance, in United States v. 
VincentI 8 the Sixth Circuit relied 
heavily on the fact that the finding 
with regard to the membership in the 
conspiracy was a finding to be made 
by the trial judge rather than the jury. 
As a consequence, the judge is not 
"bound by the rules of evidence." 
Hence, in the Sixth Circuit the trial 
judges can rely on the hearsay state-
ments themselves in determining the 
membership in the conspiracy. If ever 
there was potential for a bootstrap-
ping admissibility finding, it certainly 
exists today in the federal courts of 
Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Ten-
nessee. 
Related to the problem of proving 
the existence of the conspiracy and 
membership in it is the manner of 
presentation of evidence. As every ex-
perienced criminal defense lawyer 
knows, the government is not first re-
quired to prove the existence of the 
conspiracy and the membership in it 
and then offer the hearsay statement 
to the jury. To the contrary, the 
general rule is that the trial judge, in 
his or her discretion, may allow the 
offer of the statement first. A limiting 
instruction would then be given, 
noting that the statement is "subject 
to being connected up" by later proof 
to the satisfaction of the trial judge. 
Such a procedure is fraught with 
great risk, as a later failure to "con-
nect up" may not wholly eliminate 
the impression the statement made on 
the jurors' minds. In only one recent 
case, however, was it suggested that 
the trial judge first would be required 
to find sufficient proof of the con-
spiracy before the statement could be 
admitted. Ultimately, in that case the 
Fifth Circuit en banc reversed .17 
The final co-conspirator declara-
tion issue concerns the use of state-
ments where the defendant/ con-
spirator is currently on trial but the 
The courts take the 
position that the state-
ment of the acquitted 
co-conspirator is ad-
missible. 
declarant! co-conspirator was previ· 
ously acquitted of the same COl-
spiracy charge. The courts take the 
position that the statement of tl!( 
acquitted co-conspirator is admis-
sible. All the trial judge in the secold 
trial must determine is that the decl.· 
ant was a member of the conspiracy 
and that he or she made the statemCil 
in furtherance and during the coune 
October 1980 Tw.J.i 
of it. As stated by the Seventh Cir-
cuit: 18 
"[T]he differences between what 
must be proved to invoke the hearsay 
exception and what must be proved in 
order to convict a person of the crime 
of conspiracy, as well as the dif-
ference in burden of proof , mean that 
neither collateral estoppel nor res 
judicata automatically bars the use of 
statements by a person who has been 
acquitted of the crime of con-
spiracy .... ' , 
This rule makes sense because the 
burdens of the government are very 
different; the prosecution must only 
make a prima facie showing, or 
demonstra te by a preponderance of 
.. . the serious potential 
in federal prosecutions 
for the unilateral ap-
proach does not exist 
at this time. 
the evidence , that a statement was 
made during the course of and in 
furtheran ce of the con s piracy . 
Nevertheless, as a matter of policy it 
is somewhat difficult to justify thi s 
rule. After all, a jury found that the 
government did not prove that the 
defendant was a functioning member 
of the conspiracy when the statement 
was supposed to have been made . 
Considering the great weight given to 
the co-conspirator's declaration in 
many trials , this evidence may be 
decisive . 
The Slight Evidence Rule 
Proof of guilt must be personal. 
The government must prove, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that this defen-
dant committed the crime. Is it possi-
ble, then, that " [o]nce the existence 
of a conspiracy is establi shed, even 
slight evidence connecting a defen-
dant to the conspiracy may be suffi-
cient proof of hi s involvement in the 
scheme"? Not only is such a view 
possible, but it is the prevailing law in 
most circuits. As the Eighth Circuit 
pointed out in the above quote , the 
essence of the proof requirement goes 
to the establishment of the con-
spiracy , rather than the connection of 
the defendant to it. ,g Sometimes this 
"slight evidence rule " is formulated 
differently: 
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"Once the ex istence of a con-
s piracy is es tablished, evidence 
establishing beyond reasonable doubt 
a connection of a defendant with a 
conspiracy, even though the connec-
tion is slight, is su fficient to convict 
him with knowing participation in the 
conspiracy. Thus, the word 'slight' 
properly modi fies 'connection ' and 
not 'evidence .' I t is tied to that which 
is proved , not to the type of evidence 
or the burden of proof. "20 
The rationale behind the rule is 
hard to justify , no matter how formu-
lated . It states that appellate review is 
limited to determining whether slight 
evidence existed , not to whether there 
was substantial evidence to support a 
finding of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt as to thi s individual defendant. 
The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine 
Let us suppose the common situa-
tion . The defendants are convicted of 
di stribution (or possess ion) of nar-
cotics and conspiracy to distribute the 
drugs . The sentences given for the 
two charges are concurrent rather 
than consecutive. The defendants ap-
peal. Focusing it s attention on one of 
the counts - and it does not truly mat-
ter which - the appellate court con-
cludes that there is no error with 
regard to that count. Will the defen-
dant then have review in the appellate 
court of the second count? 
In most cases the answer is no ; ap-
plying the concurrent sentence doc-
trine most courts will say it is unnec-
essary to look to the claims with re-
gard to the remaining count. These 
The co-conspirator 
declaration is an 
established exception 
to the hearsay rule. 
courts are not required to end their 
inquiry if the evidence on one count is 
proper. Instead they are allowed to 
find that, as a matter of discretion, 
"it is 'unnecessary' to consider all the 
allegations made by a particular par-
ty."2' 
Many courts simply apply the con-
current sentence doctrine in a mech-
anistic way and hold that if anyone 
count is sufficient and the sentences 
are to run concurrently they will not 
go any further. The difficulty with 
such an analysis is that the va lidity o f 
the remaining count s ma y have great 
s ignificance. They may be par-
ti cularl y important in determining 
parole dates , jurisdiction under 
recidivism sta tutes, and the like . 
Thus, to apply th e doctrine in a 
routine way so as to avoid the legal 
... to apply the doctrine 
in a routine way ... can 
often be extremely 
damaging to the 
defendant. 
issues rai sed can often be extremely 
damaging to the defendant. Never-
theless , a good many courts apply the 
doctrine in precisely that way.n 
The Good News 
Up to thi s point I have painted a 
rather stark portrait of the problems 
faced in defending conspiracy cases . 
There is some good news, however. 
Proof of the Agreement 
Most courts do reject the unilateral 
conspiracy view and rely on the tradi-
tional view that "the crime of con-
spiracy requires a conce rt of action 
among two or more persons for a 
common purpose ... . "23 Moreover, 
the serious potential in federal pros-
ecutions for the unilateral approach 
does not exist at this time. The stan-
dard view under both the general con-
spiracy section and the Title 2 I drug 
conspiracy provisions is that proof of 
a " true agreement" conspiracy is re-
quired . Under the early draft s of the 
proposed revised criminal code, how-
ever , the Model Penal Code unilateral 
approach to conspiracy would have 
been adopted. In the most recent pro-
posal put forth the unilateral ap-
proach has been rejected .24 
Cumulative Punishment, Multiple 
Conspiracies 
While the en banc disposition in 
Rodriguez will no doubt send chills 
down the spines of the defense law-
yers who see double conspiracy 
charges, the Supreme Court as yet has 
not spoken to this point. Further, 
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Judge Rubin's dissent is a telling one, 
focusing on the rationale behind 
Braverman. At this time there is no 
clear indication that the Rodriguez 
view will prevail throughout the 
country . At least two other circuits 
have expressly rejected the reasoning 
of the Fifth Circuit. 25 
Co-Conspirator Declaration 
The co-conspirator declaration is 
an established exception to the hear-
say rule. 26 And, more importantly, it 
is heavily used in conspiracy prosecu-
tions. Still, the concerns expressed 
above may not be as serious as they 
appear. While the Sixth Circuit al-
lows the use of hearsay to establish 
the conspiracy and its membership, 
most other courts do not. Most courts 
say that the "out-of-court statement 
itself may [not] be considered by the 
trial judge in determining its ad-
missibility. "27 
The second co-conspirator declara-
tion problem relates to the order of 
proof. This continues to be an area of 
concern, as in many cases the declara-
tion comes in well before the support-
ing evidence is found by the trial 
court. Still, if the proper connection 
is not made and instructions are not 
likely to cure the harm, the mistrial 
remedy always is available . Also, 
even though the order of the proof is 
within the discretion of the trial 
court, some courts are now stating 
that the "preferred" order of proof is 
to have the foundation laid for the 
'I cannot bring myself 
to believe that upon 
appellate review only 
'slight evidence' is re-
quired to connect a 
particular defendant 
with a conspiracy.' 
declaration allowing conditional ad-
mission only when necessary. 28 
The problem of the acquitted de-
clarant - while not terribly rare - is 
not all that significant as a practical 
matter. In most cases the declarant in 
a prior trial is not acquitted. Indeed, 
in most cases, the declarant and the 
defendant are jointly on trial so the 
situation will not arise. In the case in 
which the declarant has been acquit-
ted it is true that most courts will not 
say that there is a per se rule against 
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the admissibility of his or her out-of-
court declaration. The trial judge 
will, however, look to the acquittal 
"as relevant and persuasive in the 
determination of whether the govern-
ment has demonstrated the requisite 
criminal joint venture. "2g 
The Slight Evidence Rule 
We finally come to an area where 
the good news is clearly overwhelm-
ing the bad news. The good news 
comes from the Fifth Circuit in an en 
banc opinion which is likely to have 
very significant impact. Judge Cole-
man in a panel decision stated: 
"I cannot bring myself to believe 
that upon appellate review only 
'slight evidence' is required to con-
nect a particular defendant with a 
conspiracy. 'Substantial evidence' 
should be, and I believe is the test. "30 
In the en banc disposition of the 
case the other twelve judges of the 
Fifth Circuit agreed. In an opinion 
written by Judge Coleman the court 
stated: 
"We are convinced that when the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support 
any criminal conviction, including 
conspiracies, is challenged on appeal 
the correct standard of review is 
substantial evidence, it being under-
stood, of course, that the evidence is 
to be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government. The 
'slight evidence' rule as used and ap-
plied on appeal in conspiracy cases 
since 1969 should not have been 
allowed to worm its way into the 
jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit. it 
is accordingly banished as to all ap-
peals hereafter to be decided by this 
court. "31 
The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine 
This doctrine is applied all too 
often to limit the substantive legal 
challenges by conspiracy defendants. 
I n recent years, however, more atten-
tion has been given to the adverse col-
lateral consequences which can arise 
from the unreviewed convictions. 
Several courts now have advised the 
district judges that they will review all 
claims in the normal situations. 
"Despite such statements, we have 
often applied the doctrine mechani-
cally without really considering the 
adverse consequences. Because it may 
have been unclear in our past cases, 
we now expressly hold that a court 
may not apply the concurrent 
sentence doctrine at least in the situa-
tion where there is a significant 
likelihood that the defendant will suf· 
fer adverse collateral consequences 
from the unreviewed conviction."32 
The Second Circuit was even more 
direct when it noted that "utilization 
of the concurrent sentence doctrine is 
now the exception rather than the 
rule. "33 
Conclusion 
Is it "mission impossible" today 
for the defense lawyer in the world of 
conspiracy prosecutions? No, the 
good news in some of the important 
areas does help to balance out the bad 
news. However, it is still very difficult 
for the criminal defense lawyer who is 
handling a conspiracy case. In addi· 
tion to the matters discussed above. 
there are numerous other matters 
which raise concerns for the defense 
... the heightened use 
of the conspiracy 
charge .. .is a powerful 
weapon in the pros-
ecution's arsenal. 
including prosecutions under the very 
broad RICO statute34 and so-called 
Bruton problems. 35 There is good 
reason for the heightened use of the 
conspiracy charge, especially in joint 
trials . The reason is that it is a power· 
ful weapon in the prosecution's 
arsenal: 
"It is obvious why some pros· 
ecutors, with our aid and comfort , 
are enamoured bringing allegations 
of mass conspiracy. No matter how 
thin the proof as to individual defen· 
dants, once the jury has looked at the 
sheer numbers involved and has been 
shocked by the extensive evidence of 
criminal activity by a remote actor, 
the chance that they [sic] will pay 
serious attention to the absence of 
substantial proof as to one individual 
is not particularly great. A doctrine 
which permits this impairs lib· 
erty."3~T 
(see References, page 86) 
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